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As a phenomenologist who prioritises the ‘appearing’ of
life,Michel Henry distinguishes the foundational content
of subjectivity from the horizon of pure exteriority and
inert appearances. InMarx: An Introduction, we see how
Henry’s approach to political economy qua Marx is fun-
damentally positioned around living subjectivity or, in
his own terminology, ‘incarnation’. According to Henry’s
phenomenological reading of Marx, life is fundamental
and non-economic; the frame outside of which economic
reality has no grounding. Life, phenomenologically con-
ceived of as the ultimate modality of manifestation, is
precisely what makes economics intelligible, rather than
vice versa. According to Henry, the phenomenological
inauguration of life is inherent to Marx’s thought and
the concept that has unwittingly been displaced by Marx-
ism’s misreadings. Henry contends that Marxism fails to
conceive of the economic as an ‘unreal’ and a fantasised
double of reality, treating it as inherent to and parasitic
upon life.
In turn,Henry’s ‘Introduction to the thought ofMarx’
illuminates how Marxism has been presented, and is still
being presented, as a dialectical and historical materi-
alism despite Marx’s thought not having any true con-
nection to the doctrine of materialism. For Henry, the
dialectic plays a secondary role in Marx, being a Hegelian
remnant that disappears asMarx’s oeuvre progressed. Ac-
cording to Marx, there is no dialectic essence that consti-
tutes its own internal law or reality vis-a-vis the founda-
tion of negativity. Furthermore, while for Hegel there is a
history, or a substantive and ontologically existent thread
– this reality produced by the objectification of Spirit
(Geist) – for Marx history is not the ‘self-accomplishment
of a homogenous substance’. In contrast to Hegel (and to
Bruno Bauer, who also subordinates man to a mediating
history), for Marx there is no history, there are merely
historical individuals. Furthermore, while the notion of
class is a Hegelian concept, repeated in neo-Hegelians
such as Max Stirner – who believes that the State con-
stitutes a power above human beings – for Marx class
constitutes the identity of its members. The Hegelian af-
firmation of the primacy of class over individuals is part
and parcel of ideology. As Henry will evince, it is this
individualised characterisation that is central to Marx
and which is lost in Marxism(s).
Henry separates Marx’s work into three categories:
first, the early writings until 1845; second, the historical-
political texts (The Communist Manifesto, Class Struggle,
The Eighteenth Brumaire, Civil War in France, and so on);
and, third, the economic-philosophical texts (including
the Grundrisse and Capital). Identifying the historical-
political texts as those that have given birth to Marx-
ism, constituting their meaning via the conception of an
origin, Henry ushers a return to Marx-sans-Marxism by
focusing on the economic-philosophical texts. Henry
produces a reading of Marx via an economic genea-
logy, wherein economic reality is rooted in the conver-
sion of use values (Gebrauchswert) into exchange values
(Tauschwert) via the systematic adoption of an objective
scale to measure labour. It is only through the adoption
of universal measurement to products of labour as ex-
change value that various products (e.g., linen, wheat,
metal) are equally systematised. This invariably distorts
the essence of labour – that is, it is not ‘real’ labour that
this objective scale measures but, instead, its representa-
tion, which is always exterior to that which is being rep-
resented. As the nexus of the transcendental genesis of
(capitalist) economy, measurement results in subjective
labour’s transmogrification into an objective equivalent.
‘Real labour’, or ‘labour as real’, is alien to representa-
tion and is subjective, or immanent. For Henry – who
here echoes Plato – living praxis is interior and invis-
ible while economics implies a derealisation of labour,
transforming it into an unreal double that is mimetic.
Henry asserts that Marx’s thesis is that economics is an
abstraction that presupposes and refers to a foundational
substratum.
Economic realities, which result from a process of
alienation, substitute the general for the singular, the
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social for the individual, the ideal for the real/repres-
entational. Henry’s critique is not that this is a process
that can necessarily be reversed or undone but that, un-
recognised, it produces a calamitous result: that the ab-
stract is the real. For those reader’s familiar with Fran-
cois Laruelle’s work, this will be quite familiar, since,
according to Laruelle’s non-standard reading of Marx, it
is ethico-political praxis that emancipates raw materials
and exchange-based economic practices from Standard
Philosophy’s possessive domination (or the mistaken
identification of transcendence with the real). Accord-
ing to Henry’s reading, Marx establishes how subjective
labour escapes qualitative and quantitative forces of ob-
jectifying determination. Real labour ought not to be
conflated with labour as it is objectively represented, for
this is always a result of a fiction, an artificial process born
out of socio-economic necessities. Scientism – the onto-
logical claim that those mathematical-empirical molds
that constitute and define reality objectively (vis-à-vis
laws, objects, and so on) – is one such hold, as it mis-
takes immanent life for its abstracted representation.
Henry, writing towards the end of the twentieth century,
identifies scientism (which ought not be confused with
science) with the dominant contemporary ideology, one
that results in the negation of subjective and immanent
life.
Subjective labour, reified via exchange value, is
guided by money/capital, which distances us even fur-
ther from real labour as it enacts a transcendental gen-
esis – i.e., the representation of a representation (la-
bour). Henry repeats one of Marx’s central tenets, that
without any ultimate reference to labour, capital is en-
tirely deprived of its illusory value, illuminating how,
in the last instance, capital has no economic autonomy
but is, instead, stilted by extracting and increasing sur-
plus labour. Due to the limits of the work day – and
Henry qualifies this by noting that ‘here again it is life
that imposes its regulations on economy’– the technical
and instrumental production of surplus impinges on in-
creasing productivity, or ‘relative surplus value’. Henry’s
reminder of this is a critical contemporary rejoinder to
those who point to automation as an inherently post-
capitalist phenomenon. Automation, digitisation and
actuarial finance are merely contemporaneous articula-
tions and extensions of relative surplus value. With auto-
mation, productive forces are neither the co-labour of
humans nor what is at the core of the force of production,
praxis (in the sense of the potentials and actualisations
of organic subjectivity and life). Instead, automised tech-
nics simply produce value as a coherent, instrumental
totality through objective functioning. Automation ex-
presses a shift by foreclosing the subjective forces that
create economic wealth and rendering objective forces
that produce an ‘ever-bigger mass of use values’.
Accordingly, in capitalism, economic circulation is
not directed at exchanging commodity goods (C) against
other commodity goods (C’) via a universal medium of
exchange or money (M), but by increasing capital itself.
This is precisely how the formula CMC’ transforms into
MCM’, where M’ is greater than M and the exchange of
use values is replaced by the maximisation of exchange
values. Thus, it is ‘labour power (Arbeitskraft) that be-
comes central to this transformation, which according
to Henry, cannot be separated from living praxis, or sub-
jectivity, insofar as labour is an essential modality of life.
For Henry, ‘the economic’ is prefigured by something
meta-economic, which Henry terms the ‘pure economy’
(l’économique pur). Praxis is thus necessary to lift the veil
of the ‘pure economy’ and recover a genealogical reading
of economic reality.
In ‘Life, Death: Marx and Marxism’, Henry clarifies a
contradiction inherent to capitalism: the development
of productive forces,whereby objective factors are exacer-
bated, resulting in the increase of constant capital and,
therefore, a decrease in the source of economic profits,
which inevitably results in the decline of the rate of profit.
Thus, the self-development of capital furthers the neces-
sity of automatised production processes, where labour
activity is designated to the machine, an ‘objective pro-
cess’ that is ‘no longer defined by subjective praxis’. On
the one hand, subjective praxis is inherently ontological
insofar as it relates to what Marx calls ‘consciousness’, in
which the world of ideas is structured via apperception;
on the other hand, it also stratifies the proletariat, which
has no thought, will or capacity to act in and of itself –
the proletariat is an objective class. According to Henry,
Marx’s critique of economy is truly radical because, in
exchanging the lived determinations of praxis for a re-
lational system of ideal entities, ‘what it accomplishes
is nothing less than the substitution of life for death’.
It is life that we must turn to in order to conceptualise
economic phenomena, for surplus value is incomprehens-
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ible on the plane of pure economy – this helps resolve
queries such as why and how exchange (value) eclipses
production costs. The conservation of exchange value is
essential here, as it refers to a radical ontology of life –
exchange value cannot be conserved unless the form of
use value, which bolsters it, is also conserved.
The book’s third chapter, ‘Subjective Forces and Pro-
ductivity’, sees Henry turning to socialism, where praxis
can emerge as it is removed from the concept of being as
production vis-à-vis the totality of mechanical produc-
tion. Socialism is here regarded as a system characterised
by the partial absence of subjectivity in production pro-
cesses, which Marx identified with subjective praxis’ re-
orientation from processes of production towards the de-
velopment of individual faculties such as education, art,
science, and so on. Thus, the historical situation finds a
rebirth in ‘living activity’. Since society has no autonom-
ous existence, the primacy of individual praxis always
returns to the action of individuals, rather than that of
society or a group. Here, Henry echoes Marx’s 1842 ma-
nuscripts in rejecting Hegelian universalism. Henry and
Marx afford heterogeneity primacy before determination,
reversing the Hegelian part-whole relation whereby, ac-
cording to Hegel, society-cum-Spirit constitutes indi-
viduals. Because the individual ultimately determines
the reality of society, society’s ‘reduction of totalities’ –
insofar as it is represented, classified and historicised –
must be reducible to individual praxis.
It is at this point that a question arises concerning an
individual’s integration within the sphere of immanence.
If, according to Henry, actualisation is predicated upon
subjective praxis, then social determination remains ex-
ternal to individual life – that is, it is unreal. Henry’s
solution is that, following Marx, the activity destined
to satisfy material needs, as part and parcel of subject-
ive life, is independent from social determination. As
Frédéric Seyler notes in the preface, this ‘need’ originates
as ipseity and self-generated movement (auto-affection).
Following Henry’s phenomenological approach to caus-
ation – which denies that there is any social causation
that cannot be reduced to individual praxis – are not the
social relations (rapports sociaux) which are produced by
and identical to individual praxis entangled within recip-
rocal/circular causation? That is, social conditions are
produced by the individuals that are subjected to them.
Here, Henry appeals to ‘habits’, which form and de-
termine the ‘concrete life of individuals’ – rather than
referring to a transcendent exteriority. It is through re-
petition enacted by individuals that social conditions
are reproduced. The onto-phenomenological status of
purely objective determination is treated as a product of
unreality, in need of a radically subjective approachwhich
ensures that the affective reality of social conditions con-
stitutes a frame imposed upon action. In his analysis of
alienation, Henry remarks that the labourer experiences
accidental determinations, or constraints of theworkplace,
as distinct from the movement of subjectivity, or essen-
tial determination – the former is alienating insofar as it
constrains the development of subjective potentialities.
Because an individual reproduces their social conditions,
any origin is outside of individual subjectivity – Henry
resolves alienation without appealing to the mediation
of an ideological or transcendent structure.
While essential determinations are inherent to sub-
jectivity, accidental determinations designate social me-
diations reproduced through divisions of labour repro-
duced subjectively; consider how in the workshop, fact-
ory or within the machinery of any industry there is no
objective experience but subjective experience, or phe-
nomenological existence. ContraMarx, Henry’s critique
of social praxis lionises the individual; social praxis can
only describe an intertwining of individual actions. For
instance, a city is a stratified production ultimately redu-
cible to the sum of individual efforts – any generalised
abstraction, as seen from the aperture of the ‘outside’,
is a mere representation. (Here, the reader may be re-
minded of Deleuze’s machine ontology.) The division of
labour is equivalent to the division of subjectivity. Thus,
‘social praxis’, at odds with individuated ‘real praxis’, is
the product of an abstraction comparable to the forces of
both the social and capitalist market economy, as both
repeat the ‘substitution of individual labour by general
social labour’.
Henry sees communism and socialism as opposed to
one another. Communism – or ‘communitarian social-
ism’– submerges the originally individual character of
praxis within the social, reproducing the same abstrac-
tions that led to capitalist alienation. Despite attempting
to reject the alienation that constitutes capitalism, i.e.,
the exploitation of the labourer via surplus extraction,
communism fails to abolish the alienation of differen-
tiation that anchors ‘real praxis’. Socialism galvanises
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the free development of individualities and indexes the
overcoming of alienation by rediscovering subjectivity as
life’s absolute. From this sprouts the free development of
individualities instead of the reduction of necessary ‘la-
bour time’ so as to posit (relative) surplus value, setting
free the artistic, scientific and cultural development of
individualities. Hence, activity is no longer determined
by, or confounded with, the union between individual
and production; socialism allows for private labour to
blossom as it overcomes the abstract universal of the
market economy’s ‘transcendental genesis’. The solu-
tion that socialism posits is that use value takes the form
of the community, which is characterised by the trans-
parency of social relations in accordance to participatory
common activity while, simultaneously, also understood
as private (in its production).
Henry recovers from Marx the notion that the pure
substance of the labour process is, in itself, neither ma-
terial nor economical but rooted in the development of
productive faculties, i.e., in living. Ontologically dissolv-
ing these productive forces into capacities, dispositions
and activities of individuals,Henry identifies the develop-
ment of productive forces as signifying the identical and
indefinite development of individual activities. Marx: An
Introduction reveals Henry’s singular and rigorous close
reading of Marx himself, a reading that is often muddied
or lost in the deluge of Marxist and post-Marxist critical
thought.
Ekin Erkan
Cleaning artefacts
Dan Kidner and Alex Sainsbury, eds.,Nightcleaners and ’36 to ’77 (London: Raven Row, LUX and Koenig Books, 2018).
Box-set containing two books (214pp.) and two DVDs/Blu-Rays. £24.00, 978 3 96098 381 1
From campaign film to experiment in documentary rep-
resentation, and from exemplary instance of anti-realist
and self-reflexive ‘Brechtian’ counter cinema (according
to some film theorists of the 1970s) to a semi-mythical
and almost impossible to view work of leftist filmmaking:
the history of Berwick Street Film Collective’sNightclean-
ers (begun in 1970, released in 1975) is characterised by
continual transformations and conflicting understand-
ings. In the twenty-first century, the film has returned
to wider visibility, circulating particularly in the con-
text of contemporary art. Its latest instantiation is as
a pared-down, tasteful object: a neat box-set compris-
ing two books of essays and archival materials, along-
side the two films by the collective arising from the
night-cleaners campaign –Nightcleaners itself and the
later, lesser-known ’36 to ’77 (1978), initially billed as
‘Nightcleaners part 2’. Few comparable moving-image
works receive such reverential treatment, and it seems
that Nightcleaners is now a canonical work of radical cul-
tural production in Britain, although academic film stud-
ies continues to show practically zero interest in the film.
Why has this work resurfaced to claim such talismanic
status? And what does this publication contribute to the
process?
Recent interest in Nightcleaners and ’36 to ‘77 should
be tracked in terms of a wider reinvestigation in the last
decade of post-1968 British radical and experimental film
manifested in exhibitions, publications and retrospect-
ives. The two editors, Dan Kidner and Alex Sainsbury,
have been influential figures here. Kidner organised a
retrospective of the work of Marc Karlin, one of the mem-
bers of Berwick Street Film Collective, at Picture This
in Bristol in 2012, and presented ’36 to ’77 as part of
‘The Inoperative Community’ in 2016 at Raven Row in
London, of which Sainsbury is the director. This is it-
self part of a more general process in which historic fig-
ures of radical cinema such as Chantal Akerman, Harun
Farocki, Jean-Luc Godard and Chris Marker increasingly
have their work displayed in art galleries as much as in
cinemas. Moreover, this has occurred alongside a posit-
ive re-evaluation of documentary practices discernible
in contemporary art over the last few years, as well as
this field’s fascination with collaborative artistic produc-
tion, both of which are enacted in the Berwick Street
Film Collective’s work. (The group that made Nightclean-
ers was composed of Karlin, Mary Kelly, James Scott and
Humphry Trevelyan, with Kelly being replaced by Jon
Sanders for ’36 to ’77.) There are parallels here with an-
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